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In antidumping and countervailing duty cases, why do com-
missioners of the International Trade Commission vote as they
do? Commissioners are presented with the same petitions, lis-
ten to the same oral arguments, have access to the same eco-
nomic data, and operate under the same trade laws. Yet there
is variability in voting behavior. Political economy models have
left an incomplete understanding of ITC voting and recent liter-
ature suggests there may be attributes of the commissioners that
explain their voting behavior. This study of votes on antidump-
ing and countervailing duty cases between 1992 and 1999 looks at
five such attributes: political party, party of the appointing pres-
ident, prior employment on Capitol Hill, profession as lawyers,
and prior employment in business and labor organizations. Apply-
ing a statistical analysis reveals that, of these five variables, only
prior affiliation with business and labor organizations and politi-
cal party appear related to ITC Commissioners’voting patterns.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In deciding antidumping and countervailing duty cases, why
do the commissioners of the International Trade Commission
vote as they do? Scholars have studied the ITC seeking to
understand the determinants for decision-making on trade cases.
Political economists have sought to understand the extent to
which commissioners’ votes are based on economic analysis and
statutory criteria. These explanations often have left a sense of
incomplete understanding. Others, therefore, have assessed the
exercise of discretion by commissioners, and still others have
examined the extent to which political considerations appear to
enter into Commission determinations. Many have now come to
believe that the exercise of discretion can be as important as
statutory economic factors in ITC decisions in antidumping and
countervailing cases.
In deciding on antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty
(CVD) cases, ITC commissioners must make determinations on
whether dumping and subsidies have resulted in injury, or the
threat of injury, to the petitioners. They do so by applying
certain statutory criteria. Yet, individual commissioners with
the same data, hearing the same testimony, and supposedly
applying the same set of statutory economic evaluative criteria,
often reach different conclusions. What explains these apparent
acts of discretion on the part of individual commissioners? This
article attempts to fill some of the gap in our understanding of
this question by examining the votes of the ITC commissioners
between 1992 and 1999.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The scholarly literature on ITC decision-making indicates
that commissioners operate within a range of discretion on an-
tidumping cases, albeit within statutory boundaries. This ex-
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ercise of discretion is explained within two broad categories of
analysis: economic determinism and political economy explana-
tions. However, even many of the economic analyses concede the
possible presence of political considerations. As Blonigan and
Prusa observed, “. . . no other trade instrument has AD’s unique
combination of political and economic manipulability, incentives,
and intrigue.”1 Similarly, DeVault observed that, in principle,
ITC decisions are based entirely on statutory considerations, but
“(I)n practice, ITC decisions may be influenced by other factors,
including the idiosyncracies of ITC commissioners . . . or political
pressure from Congress and the President.”2
Economic Bases for Decisions
The Commission is directed by law to consider certain statu-
tory criteria in making its decisions, such as changes in prices,
employment, capacity utilization, profitability, and market share.
But commissioners exercise discretion in the weight and impor-
tance that they give to each. Kaplan3 found that commissioners
exercise discretion in conducting their reviews of economic data
and “trends analysis” is frequently used by some commissioners
in determining whether imports are a cause of injury. Baldwin
and Steagall4 observed four other commonly used variables in
AD cases: the ratio of total imports to consumption, changes
in capacity, the direction of change in dumped and subsidized
1Bruce A. Blonigan and Thomas J. Prusa, “Antidumping,” NBER Working
Paper Series, (Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research, July, 2001): 1.
2James M. DeVault, Congressional Dominance and the International Trade
Commission,” Public Choice, vol. 110 (2002): 2.
3Seth Kaplan, “Injury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations:
Five Recent Approaches,” in P. K. M. Tharakan (ed.), Policy Implications of
Antidumping Measures, (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1991): 143–173.
4Robert E. Baldwin and Jeffrey W. Steagall, “An Analysis of ITC Decisions
in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases,” Weltwirtschaftliches
Archives, vol. 130 (1994): 290–308.
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imports, and whether the product had been the subject of a
similar previous investigation. They also found that individual
commissioners varied in the choice of economic variables used
to reach a determination. Anderson,5 on the other hand, found
that statutory considerations were stronger explanations of ITC
decisions than discretionary models. The discretionary models
Anderson considered were the “adding machine model” wherein
the ITC seeks to maximize the re-election chances of incumbent
lawmakers, and the “interest group” model that considers an in-
dustry’s influence with members of the relevant Congressional
oversight committees. These are compared with two economic
models: the “comparative effects” model that considers the ac-
tual economic effects of dumping, and the “trends” model that
focus on changes in industry conditions over time.
Liebman’s6 analysis of ITC sunset reviews of AD cases found
that commissioners adhere to the prescribed legal framework in
deciding their votes. However, he also found evidence of favorable
treatment towards industries located in “voting districts” (sic)
of Senate oversight committee members.
Sabray7 examined the decision to file antidumping petitions
and finds industry concentration, capacity utilization, and the
import penetration ratio to be significant factors in the decision
to file. While not directly considering the potential political
strength of concentrated industries, Sabray, nevertheless found
that highly concentrated industries are more likely to secure
protection.
5Keith B. Anderson, “Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision
Making at the U. S. International Trade Commission,” Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, vol. 36 (October, 1993): 915–935.
6Benjamin H. Liebman, “ITC Voting Behavior on Sunset Reviews, University
of Oregon Department of Economics Working Paper (August, 2001).
7Faten Sabray, “An Analysis of the Decision to File, The Dumping Estimates,
and The Outcome of Antidumping Petitions,” The International Trade Journal,
vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 109–145.
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Political and Political Economy Models
Moore8 found that ITC decisions were consistent with the
standards set forth in trade legislation. However, Moore also
found that petitions involving constituents of members of the
Senate trade subcommittee were treated more favorably than
others. Thus, the congressional oversight process is seen as a
possible avenue of influence for “rent seeking special interests.”9
But no corresponding suggestion of influence was found for mem-
bers of the House oversight committee. In Moore’s study of ITC
decisions for the period 1980–1986, Republicans were found to be
more protectionist than Democrats, yet the two commissioners
least likely to vote for protection were a Republican (Brunsdale)
and a Democrat (Liebeler).
Brook10 suggested evidence of party cohesion in ITC votes
on the 1992 steel cases. In this case, Democrat commissioners
supported protection more than Republican commissioners by
a two-to-one margin. Moore, however, did not view partisan
affiliation as the decisive factor in voting on the ITC. Instead
he suggested that future studies might look at other aspects
of a commissioner’s background, including regional biases and
ideological affiliations. He concluded that the composition of the
ITC is extremely important to its decisions.
Baldwin and Steagall11 presented a political economy model
for the selection of ITC commissioners wherein presidents and
8Michael O. Moore, “Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-
dumping Decisions,” Economic Inquiry, vol. 30 (July, 1992): 449–466.
9Michael O. Moore, “Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-
dumping Decisions,” Economic Inquiry, vol. 30 (July, 1992): 450.
10Douglas A. Brook, “Trade Policy Strategies and Enforcement Choices: An
Examination of the 1992 Steel Antidumping Cases,” International Trade Journal,
vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 97.
11Robert E. Baldwin and Jeffrey W. Steagall, “An Analysis of ITC Decisions
in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases,” Weltwirtschaftliches
Archives, vol. 130 (1994): 290–308.
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senators seek to maximize the political return for appointment
and confirmation of ITC commissioners. Congressional oversight
of the Commission is exercised through the confirmation and
appropriations processes. Commissioners themselves may act in a
manner to enhance their own future career interests. To Baldwin
and Steagall this analysis “. . . suggests that political economy
factors are likely to affect ITC decisions, mainly through the
role they play in determining the type of person nominated and
confirmed.” Baldwin and Steagall also argued that the foreign
policy interests of the White House and the constituency-based
interest of senators result in a situation where “(A) president is
unlikely to nominate individuals with highly protectionist views,
while the Senate is unlikely to confirm those with strong free
trade views.”12
Baldwin and Moore13 argued that Congress exercises consid-
erable influence over implementation of trade laws through four
means: changing the laws, changing the administering agencies,
changing the administrative rules and regulations, and changing
interpretation of the rules and regulations. The result, they con-
cluded, is that the actions of the Department of Commerce tend
to favor domestic companies over foreign entities.
Hansen and Prusa14 found that ITC decisions are influenced
by both economics and politics. On the political side, they deter-
mined that antidumping petitioners with facilities in the states
12Robert E. Baldwin and Jeffrey W. Steagall, “An Analysis of ITC Decisions
in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases,” Weltwirtschaftliches
Archives, vol. 130 (1994): 294.
13Robert E. Baldwin and Michael O. Moore, “Political Aspects of the Ad-
ministration of the Trade Remedy Laws,” in Richard Boltuck and Robert E. Litan
(eds.), Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws, (Washington:
Brookings, 1991), 253–280.
14Wendy L. Hansen and Thomas J. Prusa, “The Economics and Politics of
Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making,” Review of Inter-
national Economics, vol. 5 (1997): 230–245.
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and districts of senators and representatives on the committees
with oversight of the ITC have greater success. They also found
that the likelihood of receiving protection from the ITC is related
to an industry’s PAC (political action committee) contributions
to senators and representatives on oversight committees. Con-
gressional influence, and by inference, industry political influence
on the ITC, is exercised through the congressional oversight pro-
cesses. (They control for steel because steel’s successes may also
relate to to its frequent filer status; i.e., the experience factor.)
Hansen’s15 political economy model of trade policy consid-
ered both the “demand side” (industries seeking protection) and
the “supply side” (ITC grants of protection). In this model,
both economic and political considerations are at work. Hansen
identified two theoretical foundations. “Capture” theory posits
a competition among interests to lobby and influence legisla-
tors and regulators. Regulators or politicians grant regulation
so as to maximize their political support. “Congressional domi-
nance” theory, on the other hand, suggests that Congress controls
the bureaucracy and regulators through oversight and appropria-
tions. This model suggests that interests seeking to influence the
regulators do so by directing their influence toward members of
Congress with power over the bureaucracy. Hansen found some
support for the congressional dominance model.
Blonigan and Prusa point out that “(G)etting the ‘right’ per-
son on the Commission clearly changes outcomes. No formal
study has been done, however, on relating the previous back-
grounds of the commissioners to their voting records.”16 Bald-
win, however, examined the backgrounds of commissioners to
15Wendy L. Hansen, “The International Trade Commission and the Politics
of Protectionism,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 84, no. 1 (March,
1990): 21–46.
16Bruce A. Blonigan and Thomas J. Prusa, “Antidumping,” NBERWorking
Paper Series, (Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research, July, 2001): 1.
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find evidence of the relative power of the executive and legislative
branches in the selection of commissioners. Baldwin concluded
that commissioners from academia and the executive branch were
appointed with greater frequency when the president dominated
the appointments process, and that appointments of commission-
ers with private sector or legislative branch experience occured
when Congress dominated the appointments process.17
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
It would be reasonable to expect Commissioners hearing the
same arguments and applying the same trade laws would reach
similar decisions on AD and CVD cases. However, there is evi-
dence of variability in the votes cast by ITC commissioners. The
literature suggests that some characteristics of the commission-
ers could be related to the votes they cast. This study examines
certain aspects of the political and professional backgrounds of
commissioners who served between 1992 and 1999, first, to ver-
ify there is variance between commissioners’ votes and second,
to determine whether these voting differences relate to certain
attributes of the commissioners:
1) party affiliation,
2) party of the appointing president,
3) prior employment as Congressional staff members,
4) prior employment in business and labor organizations,
and
5) profession as lawyers.
Simple statistical tests are applied to votes on antidumping
and countervailing duty cases between 1992 and 1999.
17R. E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of U. S. Import Policy, (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1985): 96–97.
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The Votes
Preliminary and final votes on all (non-steel) antidumping
and countervailing duty cases between 1992 and 1999 are ana-
lyzed. Preliminary votes take place upon receipt of petitions and
the initial determinations of dumping or subsidies by the Depart-
ment of Commerce. An affirmative preliminary vote means that
there is sufficient indication of the presence of dumping or sub-
sidies and the possibility of injury for the ITC to proceed with
a formal investigation and injury determination. An affirmative
final vote is a determination that injury, or the threat of injury
is present and antidumping or countervailing duties should be
imposed. The votes were on petitions involving a wide variety
of industries and products, such as softwood lumber, portable
seismographs, salmon, Portland cement, electric typewriters, pa-
per clips, phthalic anhydride, pencils, pasta, semiconductors,
and even cookies from Denmark. (Consistent with Hansen and
Prusa, this study excludes the massive 1992 set of steel anti-
dumping cases.)
The votes selected for analysis cover the eight-year period
between 1992 and 1999, inclusive. This study looks at votes on
approximately 25 preliminary and 29 final CVD cases, and on
approximately 132 preliminary and 136 final AD cases. Eleven
individual commissioners cast a total of 710 preliminary and
728 final antidumping votes, and 127 preliminary and 136 final
countervailing duty votes. Summaries of these votes appear in
Appendix I.
The Commissioners
These votes were cast by a total of 11 different commissioners.
Members of the International Trade Commission are appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Commissioners are appointed to 9-year non-renewable terms.
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No more than three commissioners may be from the same polit-
ical party. Although political independents have been appointed
to the Commission, all of the commissioners during this period
of study were identified Democrats (six) or Republicans (five).
Six were appointed by Republican presidents (Reagan and Bush)
and five were appointed by a Democratic president (Clinton).
Appendix II indicates data about the profession and prior em-
ployment of the commissioners. Six are lawyers, six have prior
professional experience as staffmembers on Capitol Hill, and four
have prior employment in business and labor organizations.
Research Question
This study seeks to determine whether significant differences
occur between commissioners with or without certain attributes.
The following specific attributes were considered:
• Political Party. Moore observed that Republican commis-
sioners tended to favor protection more than Democratic
commissioners during the period 1980–86.18 Brook ob-
served party cleavage in the opposite direction.19 DeVault
found no obvious correlation between protectionist vot-
ing and party.20 Baldwin found a correlation between
party and votes in three periods between 1949 and 1983.21
Does a distinction by party hold for the 1992–1999 period?
18Michael O. Moore, “Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-
dumping Decisions,” Economic Inquiry, vol. 30 (July, 1992): 464.
19Douglas A. Brook, “Trade Policy Strategies and Enforcement Choices: An
Examination of the 1992 Steel Antidumping Cases,” International Trade Journal,
vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 97.
20James M. DeVault, Congressional Dominance and the International Trade
Commission,” Public Choice, vol. 110 (2002): 10.
21R. E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of U. S. Import Policy, (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1985): 90–92.
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Do Republican and Democratic commissioners vote differ-
ently, or is it possible that there is no difference?
• Party of the Appointing President. There could be some
relationship between ITC votes and the party of the
president who appointed the commissioners. There is an
important distinction between consideration of the party
of the appointing president and consideration of the party
of the commissioners. Even though the commission must
be bipartisan, presidents have great leeway to find and
appoint members of each party who are most aligned with
the trade policies of the Administration. Baldwin, however,
found no correlation between between the party of the
appointing President and the votes of his appointees of the
opposite party.22 During the period under study, it might
be argued that the political imperatives of a Democratic
president (strong labor constituencies) would lead to more
protectionist appointments than Republican presidents
(philosophical free traders). Is there a difference between
votes cast by commissioners appointed by a Democratic
president and commissioners appointed by a Republican
president, or is it possible that there is no difference?
• Lawyers. The duties of the ITC are quasi-judicial. Deci-
sions of the Commission are supposed to be based on the
application of statutory criteria. Some of the studies cited
above indicate that statutory guidelines are, in fact, ob-
served. One could expect therefore that lawyers on the
Commission might have a more technical and legalistic
approach to deciding how to vote; one that is less influ-
enced by political considerations or personal experiences.
22R. E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of U. S. Import Policy, (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1985): 93.
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If so, the votes of lawyers might be expected to be similar
and to differ from the votes of non-lawyers. Lawyers’ votes
can thus also serve as a sort of proxy for statute-based
decision-making at the ITC. Do lawyers on the ITC vote
differently than non-lawyers, or is it possible that there is
no difference?
• Business and Labor. Similarly, business organizations and
labor groups that invoke the antidumping laws might try
to influence voting behavior through appointment of sym-
pathetic members to the Commission. Unlike many public
other policy areas, business and labor petitioners often are
on the same side in trade cases, both engaged in trying
to protect their industry and its jobs.23 Thus, Commis-
sioners with prior experience in business or in labor orga-
nizations might be more sympathetic to the business and
labor petitioners that filed the cases. Do commissioners
with employment backgrounds in business and labor vote
differently than those without such employment history, or
is it possible that there is no difference?
• Congressional Staff. Liebman and others have suggested
some relationship between favorable votes on antidump-
ing petitions and the interests of members of Congress,
particularly members of congressional oversight commit-
tees. Congressional dominance theory would suggest that
Members of Congress exercise influence over ITC decisions
through the selection of politically aligned commissioners,
especially through the appointment of former members of
their staffs. A majority of the commissioners in 1992–1999
had previous experience as Capitol Hill staff members,
including some with service on the staffs of the Senate
23See, for example, Douglas A. Brook, “Meta-Strategic Lobbying,” Business
and Politics, vol. 7, issue 1 (2005): Article 4.
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Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Trade
Subcommittee. Do commissioners who were previously em-
ployed on Congressional staffs vote differently from com-
missioners without such previous employment, or is it pos-
sible that there is no difference?
IV. METHODOLOGY
To verify that variability exists in commissioners’ votes, the
mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation were calcu-
lated for the affirmative vote percentages for each commissioner
in preliminary and final antidumping and countervailing duty
cases. Second, to determine whether voting behavior varies by
commissioner attributes, two-sample t-tests and exact Wilcoxon
rank sum tests were conducted. Both tests were used because of
the small sample size.
While the two-sample t-test for equality of means is robust
to non-normality for large samples, it is also an appropriate
test for small samples if the underlying distributions are nor-
mal. Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality indicate that, except for
final countervailing duty votes, the average percentage affirma-
tive vote measures are normally distributed. In addition, results
for the Kolmogorov-Smirov and Cramer-von Mises tests for nor-
mality indicate that all four of the affirmative vote measures are
normally distributed. Separating the data by the classification
variables (attributes of the commissioners) and testing for nor-
mality would yield stronger assurance, but this was not feasible
given the even smaller sample sizes that would result. Conse-
quently, though t-tests were performed (after testing for equality
of variances and selecting the appropriate method for calculat-
ing t) a non-parametric test (the exact Wilcoxon rank sum test)
was also included in the analysis so that the more powerful re-
sults of the t-tests would be supported by a comparable method
that does not rely on the assumption of normality.
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V. ANALYSIS
The percentage of affirmative votes by each of the eleven
commissioners on preliminary and final antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty petitions is shown in Table I. There is variability
between commissioners on both preliminary and final votes, with
the greatest coefficient of variation occurring in the votes on final
determinations (.33 for final countervailing duty determinations
and .27 for final antidumping votes). Further illustrating variabil-
ity, the affirmative vote percentages on preliminary CVD cases
range from .50 (Askey) to .87 (Bragg); on final CVD cases the
range is .20 (Askey) to .80 (Koplan). For preliminary AD cases
the affirmative vote percentages range from .63 (Askey) to .92
(Newquist); on final AD cases the range is .29 (Askey) to .71
(Koplan).
Table I
Percent Affirmative Vote, 1992–1999
Countervailing Duty Antidumping
Commissioner Preliminary Final Preliminary Final
Brunsdale .71 .25 .73 .35
Rohr .78 .73 .86 .63
Newquist .82 .73 .92 .70
Nuzum .70 .57 .82 .60
Watson .55 .54 .79 .45
Crawford .64 .56 .73 .38
Bragg .87 .69 .86 .65
Miller .67 .70 .77 .60
Koplan .75 .80 .71 .71
Askey .50 .20 .63 .29
Hillman .75 .60 .70 .53
Mean .70 .58 .77 .54
S .11 .19 .09 .15
Coefficient of variation .16 .33 .11 .27
Range .37 .60 .29 .42
Source: Author’s calculations.
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The data in Table I validate the expected variability in votes
by ITC commissioners. They suggest the exercise of discretion in
votes on AD and CVD cases. Is this exercise of discretion related
to certain political, professional or employment characteristics?
The results of statistical analysis using two-sample t-tests
and exact Wilcoxon rank sum tests are shown in Appendix III.
Table II summarizes the significant variations in votes by Com-
missioner attribute. As can be readily seen, significant variation
occurs only for two attributes: political party and previous em-
ployment in business and labor organizations. Republicans and
Democrats differ significantly (<.05) in the results for both the
exact Wilcoxon rank sum test and two-sample t-test on final
CVD votes and on final AD votes. The votes of commissioners
with backgrounds in business and labor differ significantly (<.05)
from those who do not have this experience in both the exact
Wilcoxon rank sum test and two-sample t-test on preliminary
CVD votes, final CVD votes, and final AD votes, (and almost
significantly in the two-sample t-test on preliminary antidump-
ing votes at .058). There is no significant variation found in any
votes based on appointing president, or previous employment as
Table II
Summary of Significant Differences (Significant @ .05)
Commissioner Two Sample Wilcoxon Exact
Attribute t-Test Rank Sum Test
Party CVD fnal CVD final
AD final AD final
Appointing president None None
Lawyers None None
Business and labor CVD preliminary CVD preliminary
CVD final CVD final
AD final AD final
Congressional staff None None
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table III
Antidumping Votes and Political Party of Commissioner
(Average Vote Percentages (S.D.))
CVD Cases Antidumping Cases
Commissioners n Preliminary Final Preliminary Final
Republican 5 .65 (.15) .45 (.21) .75 (.09) .42 (.14)
Democrat 6 .74 (.05) .69 (.09) .80 (.09) .63 (.07)
Source: Author’s calculations.
lawyers or on congressional staffs. The results for both the t-test
and Wilcoxon test lead to identical conclusions.
VI. DISCUSSION
Political Party
Moore24 found partisan differences in his analysis of 1980–
1986 Commission votes. In his analysis, six of seven Republicans
had higher affirmative votes than the three Democratic members.
In this analysis, for the period 1992–1999, the pattern is reversed.
As shown in Table III, the average affirmative vote rating for
Democrats is higher than that of the Republicans. The direction
is inconsistent with Moore’s observation: four of five Republicans
had lower affirmative vote ratings than all six Democrats.
Applying the statistical tests to the data for party affiliation,
significant differences by political party are found. Republican
commissioners voted differently than Democratic commissioners
on final countervailing duty and final antidumping votes. Thus,
there is some evidence of party cleavage and there is some
support for the hypothesis that party and voting are related.
However, this remains a difficult area to explain. On the one
24Michael O. Moore, “Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-
dumping Decisions,” Economic Inquiry, vol. 30 (July, 1992): 464.
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Table IV
Antidumping Votes and Party of Appointing President
(Average Vote Percentages (S.D.))
CVD Cases Antidumping Cases
Commissioners n Preliminary Final Preliminary Final
Republican 6 .70 (.10) .56 (.18) .81 (.07) .52 (.14)
Democrat 5 .71 (.14) .60 (.23) .73 (.09) .56 (.16)
Source: Author’s calculations.
hand, this and previous studies have founds some relationship
between political party and voting behavior. On the other hand,
the direction of vote cleavage is inconsistent. Perhaps, political
party is confounded by other variables, or perhaps the direction
of party cleavage varies over time as policy direction is influenced
either by dominant presidents or dominant Congresses.
Appointing President
What then about the appointing president? Do votes on
the ITC relate to the party of the appointing president? One
might expect that presidents seek to influence votes through the
appointment of commissioners with views on trade policy that
are compatible with the Administration. The average voting data
by party of appointing president is shown in Table IV.
Moore’s data25 show that of nine commissioners appointed
by Republican presidents, seven ranked as the highest supporters
of protection (affirmative vote range from 1.00 to .65) and two
were the lowest (.43 and .22). Three appointed by a Democratic
president supported protection at slightly lesser rates (.71, .63.
and .52). However, votes in the 1992–1999 period show no such
discernible pattern. Commissioners appointed by a Democratic
president ranked first, third, fifth, seventh, and eleventh in
25Ibid.
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affirmative vote percentages. Those appointed by a Republican
ranked second, fourth, fifth (tie), eighth, ninth, and tenth.
Applying our statistical tests to the data on appointing pres-
idents indicates no significant difference between the votes of
commissioners appointed by Republican presidents and those ap-
pointed by a Democratic president. Thus, it cannot be concluded
from this analysis that voting behavior on the ITC is related to
the party of the appointing president. This is a rather unexpected
outcome. It suggests that 1992–1999 may have been a period of
Congressional dominance of the appointment process. Alterna-
tively, it may be that the presumed policy preferences of the
Democratic and Republican Administrations during this period
were not as clearly different as might be assumed; or at least
they were not manifested in appointments to the ITC.
Lawyers
Do lawyers on the ITC vote differently from non-lawyers? It
could be argued that lawyers might take a different, more statute-
based approach to their decisions. The average voting data for
lawyers are shown in Table V.
Applying our statistical tests to this data indicates that there
are no significant differences between the votes of lawyers and
non-lawyers on the Commission on any of the countervailing
Table V
Lawyers (Average Vote Percentages (S.D.))
CVD Cases Antidumping Cases
Commissioners n Preliminary Final Preliminary Final
Lawyers 6 .70 (.10) .66 (.10) .77 (.08) .56 (.13)
Non-Lawyers 5 .71 (.14) .49 (.25) .78 (.10) .50 (.17)
Source: Author’s calculations.
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duty or antidumping votes. Therefore it cannot be concluded
from this analysis that lawyers vote differently from non-lawyers
on the ITC. A legal background thus does not suggest itself as a
proxy for statutory-based decision-making on the ITC.
Business and Labor
Do commissioners with prior employment in business and
labor vote differently from those without such experiences? As
seen in Table VI Commissioners with backgrounds in business
and labor appear to have voted more affirmatively than did their
other colleagues.
Applying our statistical tests indicates that significant dif-
ferences exist on preliminary and countervailing duty and final
antidumping votes. Commissioners with previous employment in
business or labor voted differently than commissioners without
previous experience in business and labor organizations. Perhaps
because of their backgrounds in business or labor organizations
these commissioners are more personally or ideologically sympa-
thetic toward business and labor petitioners.
Congressional Staff
Table VII shows the average vote comparisons for com-
missioners with and without experience as congressional staff
Table VI
Business and Labor (Average Vote Percentages (S.D.))
CVD Cases Antidumping Cases
Commissioners n Preliminary Final Preliminary Final
Business and labor 4 .81 (.05) .73 (.05) .84 (.09) .67 (.04)
Non-business and labor 7 .64 (.09) .49 (.19) .74 (.06) .46 (.12)
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table VII
Congressional Staff (Average Vote Percentages (S.D.))
CVD Cases Antidumping Cases
Commissioners n Preliminary Final Preliminary Final
Congressional staff 6 .72 (.05) .66 (.10) .77 (.06) .58 (.11)
Non-congressional staff 5 .69 (.16) .48 (.25) .79 (.11) .49 (.18)
Source: Author’s calculations.
members. Former congressional staff members appear to have
slightly higher affirmative vote ratings in all categories except
preliminary antidumping determinations.
However, applying our statistical tests to the data indicates
that no significant differences exist on any of the four vote
categories. Thus, former Congressional staff members did not
vote differently from those commissioners who had not previously
served on Capitol Hill staffs. While it is certainly possible, even
highly likely, that interested Senators and representatives may
wish to see their former staff members as commissioners on the
ITC, their individual policy preferences may differ, and these
differences may then be reflected in the policy preferences of
former staffers turned commissioners. Thus, while Congressional
dominance theory may in fact be at work in the number of
appointees who come from Capitol Hill, this analysis does not
support the suggestion that former congressional staff members
cast votes differently from commissioners who have not worked
on Capitol Hill.
Having completed the above analysis, it may be tempting
to analyze the data further. Logit/probit analysis, for instance,
would provide information about the relative strength of the at-
tributes, and multinomial logit analysis would offer comparisons
between votes. However interesting this might be from an an-
alytic perspective, even if given a larger sample size to permit
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such statistical analysis, these results do not indicate great po-
tential for further understanding of voting discretion on the ITC.
Instead, more work is needed to identify other alternative hy-
potheses for which the voting data can be subject to additional
analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is significant variability in votes on antidumping and
countervailing duty cases cast by commissioners of the Interna-
tional Trade Commission. Previous studies have suggested that
the apparent exercise of discretion by individual commissioners
can be explained by certain attributes of commissioners. This
study examined the votes of commissioners between 1992 and
1999 to determine if relationships appeared to exist between
votes and political party, the party of the appointing president,
whether the commissioners were lawyers, and whether they had
previous employment in business and labor or on Capitol Hill.
There is an indication of a relationship between the vote of ITC
Commissioners and prior employment in business and labor and
also with political party. In other cases there was no significant
relationship. Overall, this simple biographical information is in-
sufficient as a full explanation of the votes of ITC commissioners.
Yet, the persistent variability in voting behavior challenges
observers to find explanations. This analysis rejects the more
superficial explanations and, in doing so, suggests that explaining
and predicting ITC voting behavior requires examination of more
subtle and sophisticated factors. The apparent relationships of
votes to prior association with business and labor organizations
and political party are suggestive in this regard. Matters of
personal experience, political ideology, and sources of political
support are difficult to determine, quantify, and analyze, but they
may provide the next level of analysis necessary to find exogenous
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explanations for ITC voting behavior. One promising area of
further inquiry is suggested by the findings of Drope and Hansen
of a “. . . significant positive relationship between petitioners’
political activities and affirmative decisions on antidumping
cases.”26
Efforts by interested parties to influence the appointment
of sympathetic commissioners could also prove instructive. An
examination of petitioners’ political activity, exercised within the
context of principal-agent theory and congressional dominance
theory, could address the matter of appointments to the ITC
and the votes of commissioners.27 In the absence of simple
explanations, it might also be time to go directly to present and
former commissioner and staff, to elicit explanations about what
leads commissioners to interpret economic data differently, select
different decision criteria, and exercise voter discretion.
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Kathryn
Kocher, of the Naval Postgraduate School, for her assistance con-
ducting the statistical analyses presented in this article.
REFERENCES
Anderson, K. B. 1993. Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction:
Decision Making at the U. S. International Trade Commis-
sion. Journal of Law and Economics 36:915–935.
Baldwin, R. E. 1985. The Political Economy of U. S. Import
Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
26Jeffrey M. Drope and Wendy Hansen, “Purchasing Protection? The Effect
of Political Spending on U.S. Trade Policy,” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 57
no. 1 (March 2004): 32.
27See James M. DeVault, Congressional Dominance and the International
Trade Commission,” Public Choice, vol. 110 (2002): 1–22.
Brook: Dumping and Subsidy Cases . . . 331
Baldwin, R. E., and Steagall, J. W. 1994. An Analysis of
ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and
Safeguard Cases. Weltwirtschaftliches Archives 130:290–308.
Baldwin, R. E., and Moore, M. O. 1991. Political Aspects of the
Administration of the Trade Remedy Laws. In: Boltuck, R.,
and Litan, R. E. (eds.), Down in the Dumps: Administration
of the Unfair Trade Laws, pp. 253–280. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution.
Blonigan, B. A., and Brown, C. P. 2003. Antidumping and
Retaliation Threats. Journal of International Economics
60:249–273.
Blonigan, B. A., and Prusa, T. J. 2001. Antidumping. NBER
Working Paper Series. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Boltuck, R., and Litan, R. E. (eds.). 1991. Down in the Dumps:
Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution.
Brook, D. A. 2003. Trade Policy Strategies and Enforcement
Choices: An Examination of the 1992 Steel Antidumping
Cases. International Trade Journal 17(1):81–99.
Brook, D. A. 2005. Meta-Strategic Lobbying. Business and
Politics 7(1):Article 4. [http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol7/
iss1/art4].
DeVault, J. M. 2002. Congressional Dominance and the Interna-
tional Trade Commission. Public Choice 110:1–22.
DeVault, J. M. 1993. Economics and the International Trade
Commission. Southern Economic Journal 60:463–478.
Drope, J. M., and Hansen, W. 2004. Purchasing Protection? The
Effect of Political Spending on U.S. Trade Policy. Political
Research Quarterly 57(1):27–37.
Hansen, W. L. 1990. The International Trade Commission and
the Politics of Protectionism. The American Political Science
Review 84(1):21–46.
332 THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE JOURNAL
Hansen, W. L., and Prusa, T. J. 1997. The Economics and
Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC
Decision Making. Review of International Economics 5:230–
245.
Kaplan, S. 1991. Injury and Causation in USITC Antidump-
ing Determinations: Five Recent Approaches. In Tharakan,
P. K. M. (ed.), Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures,
pp. 143–173. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Liebman, B. H. 2001. ITC Voting Behavior on Sunset Reviews.
University of Oregon Department of Economics Working
Paper.
Moore, M. O. 1992. Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of
ITC Antidumping Decisions. Economic Inquiry 30:449–466.
Sabray, F. 2000. An Analysis of the Decision to File, The Dump-
ing Estimates, and the Outcome of Antidumping Petitions.
The International Trade Journal 14(2):109–145.
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. March 12, 1984.
Hearing: Nominations of Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Julian I.
Jacobs, Alfred H. Kingon, Stephanie Lee-Miller, David C.
Mulford, and David B. Rohr. Washington: GPO.
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. July 24, 1985.
Hearing: Nomination of Anne E. Brunsdale. Washington:
GPO.
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. August 4, 1988.
Hearing: Nominations of Don E. Newquist, Ronald A. Cass,
and Salvatore R. Martoche. Washington: GPO.
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. June 27, 1991.
Hearing: Nominations of Desiree Tucker-Sorini, Janet A.
Nuzum, and Carol T. Crawford. Washington: GPO.
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. November 20,
1992. Hearing: Nominations of Alan M. Dunn, Peter S.
Watson, and Arnold R. Tompkins. Washington: GPO.
Brook: Dumping and Subsidy Cases . . . 333
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. March 16, 1994.
Hearing: Nominations of W. Booth Gardner and Lynn M.
Bragg. Washington: GPO.
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. June 13, 1996.
Hearing: Nominations of Raymond W. Kelly and Marcia E.
Miller. Washington: GPO.
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. November 16,
1999. Hearing: Nomination of Deanna T. Okun. Washington:
GPO.
APPENDIX I
Preliminary Antidumping Votes, 1992–1999A
Affirmative/Negative
Commissioner 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Brunsdale 19/9 15/3 9/4 43/16
Rohr 22/4 15/1 26/3 8/5 9/0 80/13
Newquist 22/1 15/0 25/3 10/3 11/0 7/1 90/8
Nuzum 13/4 15/1 24/5 8/5 9/1 4/0 73/16
Watson 10/4 15/2 24/4 7/6 8/1 1/0 65/17
Crawford 10/6 15/3 22/7 6/7 9/1 8/2 6/2 14/5 90/33
Bragg 8/0 8/5 11/0 8/1 7/0 13/4 55/9




ANote: The total preliminary and final vote counts do not equal each other or
exactly the number of cases. In some instances, commissioners partition cases
and cast multiple votes on separate elements of a single case. Also, a time span
sometimes approaching one year can intervene between preliminary and final votes,
with Commissioners arriving or leaving office in the interim.
Source: Author’s calculations from data contained in ITC Annual Reports.
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Final Antidumping Votes, 1992–1999
Affirmative/Negative
Commissioner 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Brunsdale 6/11 11/20 2/5 19/36
Rohr 10/7 19/12 10/7 20/7 3/4 62/37
Newquist 11/5 20/10 12/4 19/8 7/2 7/4 3/0 79/33
Nuzum 9/2 18/14 10/7 16/11 4/4 1/0 58/38
Watson 5/5 14/18 7/9 14/13 2/6 0/1 42/52
Crawford 4/7 6/20 7/10 12/14 4/4 2/6 2/6 8/7 45/74
Bragg 1/1 16/12 6/2 7/4 7/2 9/4 46/25
Miller 7/3 5/4 8/6 20/13
Koplan 1/1 9/4 10/4
Askey 0/1 5/11 5/12
Hillman 7/6 7/6
Source: Author’s calculations from data contained in ITC Annual Reports.
Preliminary Countervailing Duty Votes, 1992–1999
Affirmative/Negative
Commissioner 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Brunsdale 4/1 1/1 5/2
Rohr 5/0 4/2 1/1 1/0 11/3
Newquist 5/0 3/1 1/1 1/0 10/2
Nuzum 2/0 4/1 1/1 0/1 7/3
Watson 2/0 2/2 1/1 0/1 5/4
Crawford 1/0 3/2 1/1 1/0 5/4
Bragg 2/0 1/1 1/0 4/0 6/1 14/2




Source: Author’s calculations from data contained in ITC Annual Reports.
Brook: Dumping and Subsidy Cases . . . 335
Final Countervailing Duty Votes, 1992–1999
Affirmative/Negative
Commissioner 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Brunsdale 1/3 1/2 0/1 2/6
Rohr 1/1 3/0 4/0 2/3 1/0 11/4
Newquist 1/1 3/0 4/0 3/3 1/0 2/0 0/1 14/5
Nuzum 1/1 3/0 2/2 1/3 1/0 8/6
Watson 1/0 2/1 2/1 1/3 0/1 6/5
Crawford 1/0 1/2 3/1 1/3 1/0 3/1 1/2 3/2 14/11
Bragg 3/3 1/0 3/0 1/1 3/1 11/5
Miller 3/0 1/1 3/2 7/3
Koplan 1/0 3/1 4/1
Askey 0/1 1/4 1/5
Hillman 3/2 3/2
Source: Author’s calculations from data contained in ITC Annual Reports.
APPENDIX II
Characteristics of ITC Commissioners, 1992–1999
Appointing Congress
Commissioner Party President Bus/Labor Staff Lawyer
Brunsdale R R
Rohr D R x x
Newquist D R x x
Nuzum D R x
Watson R R x
Crawford R R x x
Bragg R D x
Miller D D x x
Koplan D D x x x
Askey R D
Hillman D D x x
Source: Author, from information in ITC Annual Reports.
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APPENDIX III
Exact Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Results
(Two-Sided Pr >= |S −Mean|)
CVD Cases Antidumping Cases
Commissioner
Attributes Preliminary Final Preliminary Final
Party .227 .017 .576 .045
Appointing president .894 .623 .141 .697
Lawyers .755 .355 .703 .567
Business and labor .009 .012 .097 .006
Congressional staff .999 .193 .617 .507
Two-Sample t-Test Results (Pr > |t|)
CVD Cases Antidumping Cases
Commissioner
Attributes Preliminary Final Preliminary Final
Party .186 .031 .373 .011
Appointing president .912 .785 .159 .693
Lawyers .832 .165 .858 .544
Business and labor .011 .031 .058 .009
Congressional staff .729 .135 .706 .352

